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Del gos guardià al gos vigilat: fiscalització 
i pressions entre periodistes i polítics en el context 
de la mediatització
Andreu Casero-Ripollés, Jéssica Izquierdo-Castillo, Hugo Doménech-Fabregat
Universitat Jaume I de Castelló
Political control is one of the central and 
conditioning aspects of the relations-
hip between journalists and politicians. 
Through the perceptions of journalists 
and politicians, this article analyzes the 
validity, characteristics, and functioning 
of one of the principal mechanisms of po-
litical control: the journalistic oversight of 
politics, which is linked to the watchdog 
theory and political pressures on the me-
dia. In addition, the degree of mediati-
zation of politics is measured with regard 
to media autonomy. The methodology is 
based on in-depth interviews of 45 par-
ticipants in Spain. The results indicate 
the pre-eminence of political pressures 
that are principally exercised via indi-
rect means (i.e., communications offices 
and media enterprises). The latter are a 
vehicle for channeling political control, 
which reveals the weight of the factors 
associated with political economy in the 
relationship between journalists and 
politicians. Finally, the low incidence of 
journalistic oversight of politics reveals a 
reduced level of mediatization in Spain.
El control polític és un dels aspectes cen-
trals que condicionen les relacions entre 
els periodistes i els polítics. A través de les 
percepcions dels periodistes i els polítics, 
aquest article analitza la validesa, les 
característiques i el funcionament d’un 
dels principals mecanismes del control 
polític: la vigilància del periodisme sobre 
la política, relacionada amb la teoria 
del gos guardià i les pressions polítiques 
que pateix l’autonomia dels mitjans de 
comunicació. La metodologia es basa en 
quaranta-cinc entrevistes en profunditat 
fetes a Espanya. Els resultats indiquen la 
preeminència de les pressions polítiques 
que bàsicament són exercides a través de 
mitjans indirectes (des dels gabinets de 
comunicació i els grups de comunicació); 
aquests últims representen el vehicle per 
reconduir el control polític, el qual des-
cobreix el pes dels factors de l’economia 
política en la relació existent entre els po-
lítics i els periodistes. Per acabar, la baixa 
incidència de la vigilància periodística 
sobre la política evidencia que a Espanya 
el nivell de mediatització és baix.
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On January 30, 2014, Pedro J. Ramírez was dismissed as director of the daily publication El Mundo after he had held that position for 25 years. In a speech in middle of the newsroom,2 the man who had been director up 
until that moment, one of the most powerful and influential journalists in Spain, 
unequivocally linked his fall to the political pressures exerted by the government 
of Spain, presided over by Mariano Rajoy. Specifically, El Mundo had published 
leaks regarding the alleged illegal financing of the Partido Popular (PP), which 
was linked to the Bárcenas case, the former treasurer of the party, who was at that 
time in prison for financial fraud regarding scandals related to the Spanish Royal 
Family. In his departing article, Ramírez once more blamed the government for 
his exit: “it is clear that Rajoy is betting on the myth of ‘a government without 
a press’ […] and has chosen to transform criticism and denunciations into goods 
that are increasingly onerous for publishers. It is not surprising that at Unidad 
Editorial the rope broke around my waist”.3 A few days later in an article in The 
New York Times,4 Ramírez reiterated his position, stating that “once in power… 
[Rajoy] exhibited hostility toward uncomfortable truths and indifference to pu­
blic opinion” and was fired for “speaking clearly” in his campaign to denounce 
political corruption.
The case of Pedro J. Ramírez reveals the persistence of political pressures in pre­
sent­day journalism. The phenomenon of political control is one of the central as­
pects of the relationship between journalists and politicians. In fact, they constitute 
one of its principal conditioning factors. Both actors fight to exercise power (sym­
bolic power in the former case, political power in the latter) to shape the actions of 
the other and therefore dominate their interaction to their own benefit.
The control phenomena that occur around journalistic information can have 
two directions. The first concerns those that journalists use on politicians to 
oversee their activity, which are based on the precepts of the watchdog theory of 
the press. The second concerns politicians’ attempts to shape the news for jour­
nalists through various pressure mechanisms. 
The relationships between journalists and politicians are current inserted into 
the paradigm of the mediatization of politics. This paradigm suggests that the 
media occupy a central place in political life by being the source, actor, and stage 
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upon which politics are socially represented. Thus, they exert a decisive influ­
ence on not only the perceptions of citizens regarding the contents of political 
debate but also the behavior politicians who adapt themselves to the rules of the 
game fixed by the logic of the media. 
Nevertheless, the media are unable to influence the political system unless 
they configure themselves as social institutions (i.e., relatively independent so­
cial entities), differentiated from others. Autonomy is a prerequisite of the me­
diatization of politics. In fact, the second of the four dimensions that articu­
late mediatization refers to the autonomy of the media (Strömbäck, 2010). This 
dimension measures the degree of political control of the media and the level 
of independence that the media has with respect to other social institutions. 
A broad level of professional autonomy is synonymous with strong mediatiza­
tion. Conversely, subordination of the media to politics involves a low level of 
autonomy because political logic is imposed on media logic, thereby annulling 
its ability to influence. Thus, the control phenomena that develop around jour­
nalistic information constitute a relevant indicator for measuring the incidence 
and presence of the mediatization of politics in a particular context. The other 
three phases noted by Strömbäck (2010) are related to the relevance of the media 
as source of information (the first phase), with the predominance of media logic 
of or political logic in the preparation of the news (the third phase), and with 
the influence of media logic in the activity of politicians (the fourth phase). This 
article focuses on the second phase that links mediatization with the degree of 
media autonomy. 
Through the perceptions of journalists and politicians, this article analyzes 
the validity, characteristics, and functioning of the two principal mechanisms 
of the control of journalistic information: the oversight of politics by journalism 
(which is linked to the watchdog theory of the press) and the political pressures 
on the media exercised by the political system. In addition, the degree of politi­
cal mediatization with regard to the second dimension, which is linked to media 
autonomy, is measured. 
The methodology is based on the in­depth interviews of 45 participants with 
three profiles: journalists, politicians, and communications directors. The study 
is specifically based in Spain. 
Control and journalistiC information: 
Between oversight and pressures 
Journalistic information plays a fundamental role in the political life of modern 
societies (McCombs, 2011). First, this information is considered as a primary 
source that shapes the political awareness of citizens, thereby affecting their po­
litical participation. Second, it articulates the public agenda, orienting both the 
content of political debate and the preoccupations and priorities of the citizenry. 
Finally, it influences the perceptions and opinions of the public. 
The media are situated in the center of the political dynamic within this 
framework, at the same time becoming a principal source of politics for citizens, 
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26 an active participant in political life, and the stage upon which politics are social­
ly represented. Thus, they exert considerable political and social influence, and 
this situation is linked to the mediatization of politics (Mazzoleni and Schutz, 
1999: Strömbäck, 2010). For mediatization to occur, it is necessary for the media 
to act as relatively independent organizations. This endows them with their own 
practices and criteria (Altheide and Snow, 1979) as well as with a broad degree 
of professional autonomy in preparing the news. Only then can they influence 
and cause politicians to depend, to a great extent, upon them and cause them to 
adapt to their logic (Hjarvard, 2013).
The capacity of journalistic information to influence the public makes the 
media a key strategic resource for the exercise of power. In this sense, its control 
becomes one of the axes that governs and defines the relationship between jour­
nalism and politics. Through the news, journalists aspire to extend their influ­
ence among the citizenry to shape the construction of reality and form public 
opinion. Politicians want the media to serve as vehicle for their proposals and 
policies so that they can reach a broad public and generate positive impressions 
among the citizens. 
The phenomenon of news control can take two directions within the frame­
work of the relationship between journalists and politicians. The first concerns 
the journalistic oversight of political activity. The second establishes the mecha­
nisms from the political system that condition the work of journalists. 
the watChdog in the journalistiC Control  
of politiCs 
Journalistic control becomes consolidated in the oversight or monitoring of the 
political system. The task of the media consists of overseeing political activity, es­
pecially that of the government, to detect errors, injustice, and abuses of power. 
In this way, they hold politicians accountable for their actions and defend the 
public interest, thereby alerting citizens when something is not working. Thus, 
journalism plays a watchdog function with respect to the interests of power that 
includes the critical scrutiny of political and economic elites.
This function, which is linked to the liberal theory of the media (Siebert, 
Peterson and Schramm, 1956), makes journalism the fourth power (Hampton, 
2010): a counterweight charged with watching over the correct functioning of 
the three remaining powers (legislative, executive, and judicial). Thus, it pro­
vides an important service for democracy by protecting its fundamental values. 
This role is anchored in the moral obligation associated with the social responsi­
bility of the media (Christians et al., 2009).
Following the watchdog parameters, journalistic control of politics leads to a 
predominance of criticism and aggressiveness in political news. Revealing hid­
den agendas, bad behaviors, and cases of corruption are the focus of journalis­
tic attention. This produces a tight connection between investigative journal­
ism (Kovach and Rosenstiel, 2007) and news analysis (Salgado and Strömbäck, 
2012). These effects lead to the establishment of an adversarial model in the re­
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lationship between journalists and politicians (Mazzoleni, 2012; Casero­Ripollés, 
2008). The former considered antagonists of the latter, and their interactions are 
marked by conflict, confrontation, and tension (Sintes, 2010). 
Acting as watchdog requires ample independence and professional autonomy 
on the side of journalism. This function has become a highly valued and shared 
ideal among journalists that allows them to self­affirm and legitimize their task 
and its contribution to democracy. Thus, journalists frequently use a watchdog 
strategy to present a positive image of themselves to the audience, thereby de­
fending their independence and their role (Eriksson and Östman, 2013). On oc­
casion, these efforts are a response to the attempts at control that politicians 
exert on journalists; moreover, these efforts reaffirm their autonomy in the face 
of political pressures. 
With regard to these pressures, research on political journalism in Spain re­
veals the existence of high levels of political parallelism (Hallin and Mancini, 
2004) that stand in the way of the journalistic oversight of politics. The strong 
politicization of Spanish journalism (Casero­Ripollés, 2012; Humanes, Martínez­
Nicolás and Saperas, 2013; Pérez Herrero, 2011) produces a “watchdog” function 
that is low in intensity. In fact, the impulse of this dynamic pursues the defense 
of the public interest, and on many particular occasions, activates a strategy that 
calls for the media to participate in political action (Mazzoleni, 2012). Among 
Spanish journalists, the role of disseminators of information or “populist popu­
larizers” is more important than that of watchdog because the principal goal is to 
provide citizens, who are considered consumers, with interesting and meaning­
ful information about politics (Hanitzsch, 2011). This goal leads to the predomi­
nance of scandals and corruption in the news, which offers a negative view of 
politics but does not overlap with commercial and political intent. 
pressure as an expression of politiCal Control 
of journalism 
Politicians activate mechanisms of journalistic control for two principal reasons. 
First, the news has a high strategic value. Second, exerting such control can re­
duce the risk derived from the high visibility that the media currently introduces 
into politics. The goal is to achieve access to the news under advantageous condi­
tions (Soengas, 2009). In a context in which the media enjoy relative autonomy, 
however, this is not easy. 
Despite this goal, politicians are able to activate mechanisms of journalistic 
control. Four modalities can be distinguished (Casero­Ripollés, 2009). First, the 
adoption of media logic consolidates itself in the artificial construction of events 
to capture the attention of journalists and the public. The second modality is 
the alliances between the political system and the communications system. The 
constant negotiation established between both areas (Casero­Ripollés, 2008) can 
lead to the establishment of agreements that generate mutual benefit. This col­
laboration might involve the appearance of forms of political parallelism (Hallin 
and Mancini, 2004) in which the political system dominates journalism, impo­
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28 sing its interests. The third formula of political control concerns the control of 
the news during campaigns that, in the case of Spain, annuls the professional 
autonomy of journalists. Finally, the fourth mechanism is the direct appeal to 
the public, known as “going public”, where politicians avoid any intermediation 
by the press by directly broadcasting the political message. 
The political control of journalistic activity means that pressures appear as 
a fundamental element in the relationship between journalists and politicians. 
In this sense, the literature identifies two major routes through which pressures 
are exerted. The first concerns the role played by the communications offices 
of political parties and public institutions. These organizations, which stem 
from the professionalization of political communication, are situated as direct 
interlocutors with journalists that conduct intense information management 
(Manning, 2001). Through press releases, press conferences, videos, photos, 
and other news material, they provide the media with a news subsidy (Gandy, 
1982) because they facilitate the reduction of costs in the production of news 
and maximize economic benefits. Providing or denying access to information 
is configured as a pressure mechanism applied in this context. This increases 
the dependency of journalists in political communications offices to shape the 
relationship between media and politics (Davis, 2002). Thus, journalism loses its 
independence, and its role as a fourth power is compromised (Lewis, Williams 
and Franklin, 2008).
The second route through which political pressures are exerted on the media 
concerns the media company itself. The defense of economic and corporate in­
terests (Soengas, 2009) and the strong tendency of the Spanish media to develop 
dynamics of political parallelism (e.g., instrumentalization and clientelism; Ha­
llin and Mancini, 2004) are the basis of this phenomenon. Media companies 
are the primary factor conditioning selection and coverage of news in Spain 
(Canel, Rodríguez Andrés and Sánchez Aranda, 2000; Hanitzsch and Mellado, 
2011). According to the perception of Spanish political journalists, the principal 
restriction on their professional autonomy is political pressure from within me­
dia organizations (Van Dalen, 2012). This vision diverges from that expressed by 
British, Danish, and German journalists, who place the internal pressures from 
the owners of the media last and impediments of professional routines (time and 
space) first. In Spain, the owners use their media as vehicles to negotiate with 
other principally political elites, thereby affecting political life (Curran, 2002) 
and shaping the activities of journalists. 
These pressures are the expression of the attempts of the political system to 
impose its logic and dominate the media. Its subordination to politics includes 
a low degree of mediatization because political logic is imposed on media logic, 
thereby annulling its capacity to influence the latter. In this sense, like two op­
posing concepts, the politicization of the media is opposed to mediatization. 
The control phenomenon that occurs with regard to journalistic information 
is configured as a first­order indicator for measuring the degree of mediatization 
of politics. The existence of strong and systematic pressures on journalists, which 
are able to shape the news process and originate from the political realm, are a 
manifestation of politicization and the efforts by politicians to control the news. 
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Conversely, following the “watchdog” theory of the press, the media’s develop­
ment of the intense oversight and supervision of the activities of political power 
is an expression of a high level of political mediatization. 
methodology
To study the phenomena of control in the relationships between journalists and 
politicians as well as their effect on the mediatization of politics, a methodology 
was applied based on in­depth interviews of 45 participants. These participants 
represented the three principal careers involved in political communication: 
journalists (JOU), politicians (POL), and communication directors (DIRCOM) for 
parties and public institutions. Specifically, the sample consisted of 22 journa­
lists from different areas of the media (e.g., radio, television, and newspapers); 
16 politicians with positions across various areas and levels (e.g., state, regional, 
and local), who belonged to the parties affiliated with the government and the 
opposition; and seven political communication directors, both for parties and 
public institutions. In­person interviews were conducted in three autonomous 
communities of Spain (Madrid, Catalonia, and Valencia) between January and 
May 2012. On average, the interviews lasted 45 minutes. 
the watChdog role of the spanish media
The results indicate that the watchdog function is one of the principal functions 
associated with journalism, and all three participant groups recognized this func­
tion. As noted in the interview fragments presented below, the journalists consi­
dered this role to be a key element of the successful functioning of state welfare. 
Professionals associated this function with the responsibility and democratic value 
of journalistic activity. At the same time, they linked this oversight with the social 
responsibility acquired with respect to citizens, a moral obligation in defense of 
the public interest, which they even compared with the political function played 
by the opposition leading to justify the existence of journalism. 
It is one of the keys to the rule of law systems and state welfare. Journalists must relate that 
which they think is news. (JOU5)
We should exert greater oversight over politics because it is the responsibility that we are 
delegated by the citizens. (JOU6)
Of course, journalists have this task of oversight, and if they were not to do it, [then] they 
would be superfluous. (JOU8)
The work of the journalist, together with that of the opposition, is precisely to oversee what 
the politicians are doing. (JOU13)
Some journalists also clarified the idea of the watchdog that extends throughout 
the profession, considering that oversight is beyond their role; rather, they lim­
ited their work to purely disseminating facts. Thus, these journalists rejected the 
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30 identification of journalism of an interpretative nature as a watchdog, and this 
rejection was associated with evaluations of politics. 
Journalists do not conduct a task of supervision and oversight of political activity […]. This is 
not the function of journalism. (JOU16)
I believe that our work is to explain what they [the politicians] do and why they do things. 
We are not the ones (unless there is a crime) who have to decide whether this is good or bad 
[…]. The journalist does not have a supervisory attitude, but an explanatory one, with a critical 
spirit. If you oversee or supervise news you do it for contrast, not with the desire to control it. 
(JOU21)
For their part, the majority of Spanish politicians interviewed naturally assumed 
that their activity was overseen, and they granted that this oversight had democratic 
potential. Nevertheless, they noted that journalists should perform this function 
only when imparting information and never become involved in the political arena. 
Thus, politicians implicitly accept that journalists play an adversary role but with cer­
tain limits. Politicians reject the notion that journalists should become competitors 
in setting the political agenda and shaping the process of political decision­making. 
Oversight is logical. Just as the function of parliaments is to control the actions of the govern­
ment, it is also logical that the communication media should perform this oversight function. 
(POL15)
Without opposition and without the press […], the democratic exercise of government would 
be impossible. If journalism […] goes beyond itself and expects to shape that which is the gov­
ernment’s responsibility (that is, making decisions, setting the agenda, and jointly directing the 
country), [then] it is no longer appropriate. (POL12) 
The interviews were used to detect a series of aspects that weakened the effective­
ness of the watchdog and stand in the way of its operation. These aspects are rep­
resented by two phenomena. One finds that the natural resistance of the political 
class succumbs to constant oversight. In this sense, the professionalization of po­
litical communication has led to the appearance and strengthening of press offices 
and communication directors who manage news as well as the relationship be­
tween politicians and the media (Blumler and Kavanagh, 1999). These press offices 
and communication directors manage the news and act as intermediaries to filter, 
analyze, and produce political information directed at journalists. According to the 
interviews, one of the principal functions of press offices and communication direc­
tors is to neutralize, or at least to mitigate or attenuate, the oversight conducted by 
the watchdog. The professional activity of these offices affects the freedom of the 
journalist who copes with various kinds of difficulties, from the obstruction of his 
or her professional activities to censure in political acts or the denial of information. 
If the politician has a positive relationship with the media, [then] they deal directly with him. 
Normally, however, [the news] goes through the communications office. (DIRCOM3)
You always try to do these things through the communications offices in the interest of good 
communication, which is what they expect. (POL9)
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The party communications offices […] push a lot, and they exert pressure that is intolerable at 
times. (JOU5)
The second phenomenon that stands in the way of journalistic oversight of politics 
concerns the economic crisis. Journalists recognize that the principal impediment 
for exercising greater oversight is the lack of resources and the delicate financial 
situation that most of their companies are in today (Casero­Ripollés and Izquierdo­
Castillo, 2013). The link of the watchdog role to the exercise of investigative jour­
nalism explains this subordination to the economy. Thus, the tasks of oversight of 
political activity conducted by the media are burdened by a context in which the 
priority is to reduce costs and personnel. This situation limits resources and there­
fore the ability of journalism to appropriately oversee political activity. 
Investigative journalism, which plays the role of the watchdog, costs money, and the current 
crisis, both in general and as it affects the media, means that this type of journalism suffers. 
(PER2)
Journalists can considerably improve the way that they oversee; however, the problem we face 
in regard to investigating things or trying to get stories using “crumbs” of things that should be 
reported is a problem of time and access, [and this problem] is getting worse because there are 
increasingly few of us in the media and more things to do… (PER14)
Politicians are also aware that oversight is not often compatible with the financial 
crises of current media companies. Thus, communications directors recognize that 
the resources that journalists can draw on are insufficient, and this situation repre­
sents a problem for exercising the watchdog function. 
They [journalists] do it [oversight] because they are on top of you and are hanging there. How­
ever, it is insufficient because of the lack of resources […]. The problem is the lack of time to 
perform more supervision. (DIRCOM3)
Thus, the economic crisis is one of the principal factors that affect the effectiveness 
of oversight. When the media are cutting costs, the ability to oversee political activ­
ity is under threat. Nevertheless, some media have opted to take advantage of the 
crisis situation to redefine how they provide news, focusing on doing a better job as 
watchdog. In this way, they seek to attract the public and connect with the interests 
of the populace. In Spain, new media such as InfoLibre.es, Eldiario.es, El Confiden­
cial.com, and Información Sensible.com have appeared. These digital media sources 
incorporate investigation and the journalistic oversight of politics as a commercial 
strategy to build market share. 
politiCal pressures on journalists 
The results of the interviews demonstrated that journalists, politicians, and com­
munications directors openly recognize the existence of the political pressures on 
journalism and note that different ways exist of conducting them in practice. 
ANDReU CASeRO-RIPOlléS, JéSSICA IzqUIeRDO-CASTIllO, HUgO DOMéNeCH-FABRegAT
TR
ÍP
O
D
O
S 
20
14
   
|  
 3
4
32 The pressures that politicians place on journalists are clear. There are many ways to domes­
ticate the media. (POL8)
Pressure always exists, both in the private and public media, because nobody likes having 
people talking badly about you. (JOU4)
The pressures on journalists can be direct or indirect, and they take place in a thousand 
different ways. The most shameless might be the denial of information that is in the public 
interest. (JOU8)
Politicians justify these pressures by relying on the significant strategic value 
of the news for transmitting their proposals and messages to the populace. In 
this sense, they see journalistic information as a key resource for political action 
because it is linked to power and its exercise on the one hand, and the notable 
ability for social influence on the other. 
Political information is power, and power protects itself. For this reason, politics uses the 
whole range of pressure within its reach. (POL2)
Journalists certainly have the capacity for influence. The perception of the value of politics 
depends on the information. (POL17)
Through the communication media, society will gain an image of a way of governing or a 
particular policy. Logically, there are pressures, and many are successful. (JOU4) 
These pressures can be considered a logical consequence of the relationship be­
tween politicians and journalists. However, each profession interprets them with 
a different meaning. In a certain way, most politicians legitimize the use of pres­
sure, thereby moving the responsibility to journalists and their employers who, 
in their opinion, are the ones who give in to the pressure. On the contrary, 
journalists understand the pressure placed on them by the political system as a 
significant limitation of their professional autonomy. 
The worst thing is not the pressure but the vocation for being pressured [that some journa­
lists have]. (DIRCOM1) 
What is relevant is not that there is pressure, but that there are explicit means in the media for 
dealing with it: professional codes, declarations of corporate social responsibility, etc. (POL2) 
There is significant pressure, especially recently, and this affects all the communications me­
dia, no matter how independent they are (…). Before writing political news, the journalist 
must use many filters (JOU13)
The type of interaction between journalists and politicians shapes these pressures 
and their effectiveness. Thus, the results obtained indicate that the establish­
ment of a personal relationship of friendship or ideological affinity facilitates 
attempts at political control and improves their effectiveness. It is even the case 
that, from the perspective of politicians, proximity and closeness to journalists is 
used to justify and normalize pressures. 
There are journalists who maintain personal relationships with politicians, and the latter 
influence the former; however, I believe that these are normal, good pressures. (POL7) 
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The parties distribute talking points regarding their ideas to journalists who are close to 
them, and they use them as they wish. It is a symbiotic relationship. (POL11)
Like in all professions there are contacts and relationships that frame the way that a piece of 
news will be published. (JOU22)
 
However, when a friendship or an ideological affinity is not present, pressures are 
channeled in a more aggressive way, with threats or blackmail directed toward 
the journalist or his or her company. According to the interviews, the denial of 
access to information and economic coercion are the most usual mechanisms in 
these cases. 
The most frequently used measure is the threat of no longer supplying information or re­
moving the subsidy. (JOU 18)
The strongest temptation is that of rewarding your friend with scoops and punishing critics, 
including forbidding his presence. (DIRCOM 2) 
The most shameless censure is the denial of information or personal threat. These actions 
can be crystallized in the blackmail of journalists who have compromising information on 
politicians. (JOU8) 
Often, the pressures are so well hidden that it seems that they do not exist; however, journalists 
face difficult situations on many occasions. (JOU5)
In general, journalists feel these pressures from the political system in an indirect 
way. In other words, politicians rarely come into direct contact with journalists. 
The interviews show that politicians typically transmit pressure through their in­
termediaries. On the one hand, they use their press offices and communications 
directors to manage pressure strategies; on the other hand, the media company 
and its directors become, on many occasions, the link through which the pres­
sures that habitually reach editors and intermediate positions are channeled. The 
types of pressure that the journalist feels via these two routes differ, as do the 
consequences that result from not responding to the demands. 
In the first case, the professionalization of political communication has 
strengthened the role of communication directors and their function in mana­
ging political information. The communications offices of parties and institu­
tions assume the task of activating the pressure mechanisms, thereby avoiding 
having the politicians themselves directly confront the journalists. Thus, they 
act as an offensive weapon for political leaders in intermediating the relation­
ships between politicians and journalists. 
Pressures on communication groups, yes, certainly (…); calling a journalist is counterpro­
ductive, that, never. (POL11) 
Offices of communications are very effective and sometimes exert intolerable pressure. (JOU 5)
One very typical form of pressure is the control of information exerted through the press 
chiefs of political parties (…). The toughest calls and discussion have been with the press 
chiefs; this is where the most pressure comes from. (JOU19) 
Generally, unless they trust the journalist or the media in question, this supervision does 
not usually come from the politician but rather the communications office. (DIRCOM3)
ANDReU CASeRO-RIPOlléS, JéSSICA IzqUIeRDO-CASTIllO, HUgO DOMéNeCH-FABRegAT
TR
ÍP
O
D
O
S 
20
14
   
|  
 3
4
34 It is not the same when I call La Vanguardia and tell them, “I don’t like the way you reported 
this story” as when I call the press office for the President of the Generalitat. (POL16) 
The management of information in communications offices becomes an effective 
mechanism for exerting pressure on journalists. The politicians interviewed recog­
nized that disseminating information regarding events or political actors and the 
denial of access to political events are among the most typical means. According to 
the interviews, pressure can even include the veto of various journalists.
Disseminating information might be one of the most often used types of control used by 
political sources. (POL14) 
The most shameless [means] are denying information or access to information of interest to 
the public. Softer forms are discriminating with regard to whom you are disclosing informa­
tion that should reach everyone equally. (JOU8)
With respect to the mechanisms that they [communications offices] use, recently it has been 
very popular for them to send us the news ready to report, without calling you or sending 
you the press notice. (JOU10) 
The second way through which politicians exert pressure on journalists indirectly 
concerns media companies. According to a large proportion of the journalists in­
terviewed, their organizations become the vehicle that channels political pressure. 
Thus, the owners or managers are those responsible for translating the “suggested” 
instructions from the politicians to low­level editors, thereby conditioning their 
work. The defense of the corporate interests of the media, both economic and po­
litical, is the motive that explains this company behavior; far from protecting the 
professional autonomy of journalists, it contributes to reducing it, making it one 
of the ways in which political control appears. The fact that media companies play 
this role reveals the strong presence of the aspects linked to political economy in 
the relationship between politicians and journalists. Far from being contextual fac­
tors, these aspects are situated at the center of the interaction between the media 
and politics, decisively influencing it. 
Rarely does the politician say, ‘It’s none of your business.’ It almost never gets to this ex­
treme; however, you do get messages now and then from the directors of your company. 
(JOU7)
One means of pressure consists of the politician speaking directly to the stockholders or the 
director of the periodical to try to restrain particular stories. (JOU2) 
The mechanism that guarantees the success of the political pressures that are 
channeled through the media is the possible firing of the journalist who does 
not attend to them. The results suggest that journalistic professionals recog­
nize this threat as a risk associated with their work and its working conditions. 
Thus, this circumstance is seen as a conditioning factor that is always present 
when the news is prepared and as a factor that reduces their professional au­
tonomy. One journalist graphically described the situation as “signing away 
your freedom”. 
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Signing with the media is synonymous with signing away your freedom, where the strongest 
form of pressure on the journalist is to fire them. (JOU 6)
Those journalists who in a reasonable and honorable way maintain a position of indepen­
dence are risking their jobs. (JOU 3)
Often, going along is confused with ideological affinity, and defending independence pre­
supposes risking your job on too many occasions. (JOU 3)
The connections of this mode of political pressure channeled through the com­
pany under a particular political economy are materialized in the appearance of 
political parallelism phenomena (Hallin and Mancini, 2004) in the relationship 
between journalists and politicians. Thus, pressures activate three variants ac­
cording to those interviewed. The first case is the subordination of the media to 
a politician. This case corresponds with the instrumentalization that affects the 
public media in Spain, especially television. Those interviewed considered the 
positions of politicians in the management of public radio and television coun­
cils as facilitating control of these media and as the subordination of the news to 
the government’s interests. 
The public media are an expression of the government, not an expression of political plural­
ism and a free society. (POL8) 
Politicians have a responsibility in the public media; thus, there is always an inclination. 
(JOU4)
This television [station] has an administrative council upon which all the parties are repre­
sented, as are the courts; this is obviously already a form of control (JOU12)
The second variant is linked to the editorial line of the media, which occasion­
ally has specific ideologies that are consonant with the interests of certain politi­
cians. When this affinity occurs, the professional autonomy of the journalist is 
reduced, and a cooperative relationship of dependence is established between 
the media and the politician based on the presence of a policy of alliances as a 
mechanism of control (Casero­Ripollés, 2009). Thus, the independence of the 
journalist conflicts with the interests and goals of his or her company, the latter 
of which prevails. 
It is evident that there is always an editorial line and various interests for each company, so 
it is important to know what team you are playing for. (JOU1) 
Every journalist knows where he works, where he is, what that the editorial line of his com­
pany is (…). If you are in a company whose ideology you don’t share, [then] it’s better for 
you to leave. (JOU4)
The most important pressures are those that come from the editorial lines of the companies. 
(DIRCOM6) 
There are great journalists who report politics and who are independent people in regard to 
dealing with the news, but there is also the editorial line. (DIRCOM4) 
The third variant involves the activation of mechanisms based on clientelism. 
This mode is a characteristic of the system of media based on the model of 
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36 pola rized pluralism within which Spain and other southern European coun­
tries are included (Hallin and Mancini, 2004). Clientelism means that politi­
cians manage various resources that can benefit media companies economi­
cally. Principally among these are subventions to the media, broadcast licenses 
for television and radio, and institutional publicity. However, clientelism can 
also affect how scoops are filtered or manage preferential treatment for ac­
cess to information. The results of the interviews indicate that all of these 
incentives are used in Spain to politically control journalism. Thus, a logic of 
exchange is imposed. 
Economic pressures are very clear (…). The removal of advertising in your media is the prin­
cipal means to exert pressure. (JOU2) 
The journalist who provides information to the journalist establishes a relationship that is 
based on exchange. (JOU16)
The most frequently used [type of] control is the threat of not providing more information 
and removing or freezing institutional subvention. (JOU18) 
The pressures placed on journalists by politicians are clear (…). Starting with bribery regar­
ding institutional advertising, there are many ways to try to domesticate the media. (POL8) 
The politician negotiates with scoops: “If you report this, [then] I will give you a scoop.” 
(POL15) 
The current economic crisis has generated serious financial problems for me­
dia companies in Spain (Casero­Ripollés and Izquierdo­Castillo, 2013) and 
has created new scenarios with regard to political pressures based on clien­
telism. The results of the interviews show that these effects have generated 
a paradox. The media have intensified their need for resources, and it can be 
easier for politicians to exert pressure in this way. The economic vulnerability 
of media companies reduces their ability to defend against attempts at politi­
cal control. 
Certainly there is pressure, both from political and economic sources and more pressure in 
a moment of crisis. (JOU1)
The serious economic crisis and the need for the media to help, however it might come, 
makes [journalists] them more vulnerable. (JOU8)
The scarcity of resources due to the financial crisis also affects politicians. They 
recognize that the clientelistic pressures exerted on current journalists are de­
monstrably weakened due to the lack of public economic resources within the 
government. Therefore, the crisis moderates clientelism and restrains political 
pressures. 
Because there is no money, the money that goes to communications media has diminished 
drastically, so that at this point, in this sense, it is not exercising any type of pressure or 
control. What might have happened earlier, when there was money, is another matter […]. 
To the extent that there are no resources for media, the degree of dependence is very much 
reduced. (POL9) 
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ConClusions
The results of the current analysis indicate the predominance of political pres­
sures on journalists. Their presence was widely admitted, and they are considered 
to be inextricably associated with the relationship between journalists and poli­
ticians. The latter defend themselves by accusing the former of becoming sub­
jected to coercions to justify their existence. This study shows that the defense 
of the economic or political interests of media companies, on the one hand, and 
the closeness based on friendships or ideological affinities, on the other hand, 
are considered elements that facilitate political pressure. According to those in­
terviewed, the former is particularly effective because media corporations and 
communication groups act as vehicles that channel pressures toward journalists 
within their organizations. This way is effective at imposing political control and 
reducing the professional autonomy of the journalists because they risk losing 
their jobs if they do not yield. 
These findings allow for the assertion that aspects related to political eco­
nomy play a much more relevant role than one would think in the relation­
ship between journalists and politicians. The interaction between these groups is 
not merely professional or personal; rather, institutional factors play a key role. 
These factors explain the incidence of political parallelism in the political control 
of journalism. This control is manifested through three variants in Spain: the 
instrumentalization that affects the public media, the ideological affinity that ac­
tivates a policy of alliances based on cooperation, and clientelism that is directed 
toward the management of economic resources. 
The predominance of the political economy means that one can identify a 
novel factor that has an effect on the political control of journalism. One such 
factor is the economic crisis, which is tightly linked with both journalistic over­
sight and political pressures. The financial weaknesses that media corporations 
experience have caused reductions in costs, which have generated a scarcity of 
resources, both in general funding and for the personnel who produce the news. 
This lack of funds in the media reduces the ability and likelihood of journa­
lists to act as watchdogs. Together with the low level of oversight in Spain, this 
fact means that one can foresee a short­term reduction of this function. In this 
scenario, however, some digital media have relied on political oversight as their 
supply of news to attract audiences. We must wait to evaluate its future effects on 
Spanish political journalism. 
The economic crisis also directly affects the political pressures on journalists, 
in this case, generating a paradox. Journalists perceive that financial problems 
facilitate political impositions and coercion through media companies. Because 
they are in a fragile situation, media companies have fewer resources to restrain 
political attempts at control. For their part, the politicians stated that public ad­
ministrations have seen their economic resources reduced considerably during 
this crisis. In their view, this circumstance makes it difficult to set the pressures 
based on the logic of clientelism in motion. Thus, the economic crisis moderates 
or slows the clientelism that a proportion of the attempts at political control of 
the media are based on, thereby reducing their effect and effectiveness. 
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Another relevant factor with regard to control over journalistic information is 
the one exercised by communications offices associated with political parties and 
public institutions. These organizations, which are the product of the profession­
alization of political communication, meet two control process goals. On the one 
hand, they act as a protective shield to defend politicians from attempts at over­
sight by watchdog journalists. On the other hand, they function as a battering ram 
in exerting pressures on behalf of the politician, thereby avoiding his or her direct 
involvement. Both goals are principally accomplished through the management 
of public relations, news releases, and direct conversation with journalists. 
Finally, the results indicate a low incidence of journalistic watchdog over­
sight in Spanish politics. Although the exercise of this function is associated 
with journalism and considered beneficial for democracy, it more often appears 
as a declaration of intention or a normative ideal than as a professional practice 
habitually employed by the Spanish media. The interviews detected the absence 
of unanimity among journalists themselves in regard to defining this role, the 
limits that politicians establish with regard to its action, and the presence of 
aspects that stand in the way of or weaken its application. All of these concerns 
reduce the ability of journalists to monitor politics in Spain. 
The control of journalistic information moderates the mediatization of politics 
in Spain. The low incidence of watchdog oversight and the solid presence of po­
litical pressures within the relationship between journalists and politicians means 
that political logic is imposed over media logic, thereby reducing its capacity to 
influence. Thus, politicization predominates, and the second dimension of media­
tization (i.e., the professional autonomy of journalists) is low in Spain. 
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